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1 The need for coherency
Personal data or data that enable the identification of a natural person are due to their 
inherent link to the right to a private life, protected by a specific set of rules within the 
European Union (further: EU). These rules provide protection on the level of collect-
ing these data and subsequently using them.
The origin of the EU’s data protection rules really lies in the first pillar where 
the creation of an internal market in the EC ensured the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital between the member states. Removing all obstacles to 
realize this free movement includes removing restrictions on trade. As restrictions 
are often the result of divergent national legislations, a certain level of approximation 
was considered necessary for the functioning of the common market. Including also 
the flow of personal data in the free movement of goods and services (De Hert, 2004, 
p. 7), harmonised rules were needed on the level of personal data protection. In order 
to protect these harmonised data protection systems, the same values should be sus-
tained when transferring personal data outside the internal market and to third states 
or institutions.
Although the Council of Europe (further: CoE) took the lead in drawing up the 
standards, the consensus within the EU to copy and implement them, was in first 
instance broad. With the right to a private life protected by the European Convention 
for the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms (further: ECHR), which 
allows room for derogating from it, a similar approach was taken to the data quality 
standards.
With its wide scope of automatic processing of all personal data, the CoE’s 
Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing 
of personal data (ETS N° 108, 18 January 1981; further: data protection convention) 
served as a basis for copying the same standards in more specific instruments.
While data processing in the course of activities falling within the scope of 
Community law was governed by a set of binding instruments (Directive 95/46/EC, 
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O.J.L, 23 November 1995, issue 281, p. 31-50) Directive 2002/58/EC on data process-
ing in the telecommunication sector, O.J.L, 31 July 2002, issue 201, p. 37-47) and 
Regulation 45/2001 on data exchange between Community institutions or bodies or to 
third institutions or bodies, O.J.L, 12 January 2001, issue 8, p. 1-22), data processing by 
judicial and law enforcement authorities within the third pillar had to rely on national 
law or on the general data protection convention.
As part of an area of freedom, the need for an instrument on data protection in the 
third pillar was felt and expressed in the 1998 Vienna Action Plan and planned to be 
developed by 2000 (O.J.C 23 January 1999, issue 19, § 7 and § 47). Despite numerous 
efforts (see inter alia Council, 6316/2/01, 12 April 2001; Commission, COM(2005) 475 
final, 4 October 2005 and Council, 7315/1/07, 24 April 2007), the Council has been 
working for more than five years on a proposal for a Framework Decision member 
states can agree on. Creating a coherent data protection instrument in the third pillar 
proved to be a challenge, not in the least because of the involvement of the member 
states in the decision making process (see also De Hert and De Schutter, 2008, p. 
329-333).
The Council agreed on framework decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in crimi-
nal matters (further: framework decision on data protection in criminal matters) of 24 
June 2008, which was formally adopted in December 2008 (O.J.L 30 December 2008, 
issue 350, p. 60-71). The instrument entered into force in January 2009.
The expectations were high as this new instrument was supposed to answer to the 
need for a coherent policy that is custom-made for the exchange of personal data in 
criminal matters. The need for coherency was particularly high when the transfers of 
personal data to third states or institutions was concerned. Protecting personal data 
that are processed within the borders of the EU includes protection for exchanging 
these data with third states or institutions as the recipients are not necessarily bound 
by the same data protection principles. The solution was found in requiring the receiv-
ing state or institution to provide in a level of data protection that was adequate in 
comparison to the EU standards so personal data could safely cross the external EU 
borders. However, legal instruments covering data protection do not provide in rules 
on this type of protection or are not generally binding throughout the EU. (see also De 
Hert and De Schutter, 2008, p. 309)
The need for a coherent policy on data transfers to third states or bodies was nev-
ertheless not fully answered by the new framework decision. Its partial scope, the 
possible derogations to the requirement of adequacy, the lack of a uniform assessment 
and the effects of the new instrument on existing and future provisions, make the 
framework decision an inappropriate instrument for mending the inconsistencies in 
the third pillar’s data protection policy towards outgoing data transfers.
In agreements that have been concluded between the United States of America 
(US) on the one hand and the EU (Agreement 25 June 2003 on mutual legal assist-
ance between the European Union and the United States of America, O.J.L. 19 July 
2003, issue 181, p. 34-42), Europol (Agreement between the United States of America 
and the European Police Office, 6 December 2001) and Eurojust (Agreement between 
Eurojust and the United States of America, 6 November 2006) on the other hand, the 
adequacy requirement is losing its significance by a lack of application or by being 
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excluded from the agreement altogether. This is however not the case in every agree-
ment with a third state.
The last and most recent negative effect on the adequacy requirement is visible in 
the preparatory future plans for the EU’s justice and home affairs policy for 2010-2014 
(The Informal High Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs 
Policy (“The Future Group”), Report, Freedom, Security, Privacy – European Home 
Affairs in an Open World, June 2008 and High-Level Advisory Group on the Future 
of European Justice Policy, Proposed Solutions for the Future EU Justice Programme, 
June 2008). These functioned as the travaux préparatoires for the so called Stockholm 
Programme (COM (2009) 262/4), the successor of the Hague Programme. Again with 
regard to the transatlantic cooperation in criminal matters the adequacy of the level of 
data protection in the US is assumed rather than thoroughly examined.
In this contribution the EU’s policy on data exchange in criminal matters to third 
states or institutions is first studied from the perspective before and after the frame-
work decision on data protection in criminal matters. Secondly, the provisions of the 
framework decision that regulate the outgoing data transfer – including the effects 
on existing and future provisions – are examined. In a third and final part, the future 
of the adequacy requirement in agreements with third states and as included in the 
policy plans of the EU is reflected on.
2 Before the framework decision
Before the framework decision on data protection in criminal matters was developed, 
binding provisions on data protection were limited to the CoE instrument applicable to 
all automatic personal data processing or the EU’s first pillar instruments. The require-
ment to ensure an adequate level of data protection in the receiving state or institution 
is intended to protect the EU standards on data protection whenever personal data are 
exchanged with a national authority or an institution located outside the EU territory. 
With regard to data transfers to third states or institutions, this requirement has first 
been included in Directive 95/46/EC regarding data transfers for the purpose of activi-
ties within the scope of Community law. In 2001 the requirement was included in the 
Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, regarding Supervisory Authorities and Trans-
border Data Flows (ETS, N° 181, 8 November 2001; further: the additional protocol to 
the data protection convention). Also specific data protection provisions in the relevant 
Eurojust and Europol instruments, provide in the requirement.
However, a general rule on ensuring an adequate level of data protection in the 
receiving state or institution was inexistent for the field of criminal matters.
2.1 Limited rules on data transfers to third states or institutions
The instruments that provide in rules on data transfers to third states are limited. 
The Council of Europe’s data protection convention encompasses basic rules for data 
protection in view of a trans-border exchange to a contracting party. All EU member 
states have ratified this convention. Thus, the exchange of personal data between mem-
GOFS 4.indd   97 15-01-2010   16:24:39
Topical issues in eu and inTernaTional crime conTrol
98 Maklu 
ber states – with a view to the automatic processing of data – should run in accordance 
with the data quality standards provided by the data protection convention.
However, no rules are provided when sending data directly to a state that has not 
ratified the convention and is therefore not necessarily bound by the same principles. 
Only the indirect transfer of personal data is regulated as the convention foresees the 
situation in which a state party transfers personal data to a third state via the territory 
of a state party. In that case, exceptionally, the transferring state is allowed to lay down 
additional protective rules (prohibitions or added requirements of authorisation) if 
these serve the purpose of maintaining the level of data protection and avoiding the 
circumvention of the legislation of the transferring state.
Directly sending personal data from a state bound by the data protection conven-
tion to a state that is not party to the convention is regulated by the 2001 additional 
protocol. The instrument provides in an additional requirement that encompasses an 
examination of the receiving state’s data protection system. The system needs to be 
assessed on its adequacy in relation to the standards laid down by the data protection 
convention. However, it was not the additional protocol that introduced the adequacy 
requirement.
For activities within the scope of Community law, Directive 95/46/EC subjects the 
outgoing data transfers to the requirement of adequacy. No personal data can be sent 
to a state that does not pass the assessment of its legal framework on data protec-
tion. The prerequisite ruffled a few feathers in third states’ authorities (Boehmer and 
Palmer, 1993, p. 307-308; Bennet and Raab, 1997, p. 245-263 and Long and Quek, 
2002, p. 334-337). In the cooperation with the EC, the entry into force of Directive 
95/46 caused the US to take action in ensuring the protection of data received from 
the EC. The processing of data that is aimed at here is the processing for the purpose 
of trade with US companies. Data protection by US companies does not fall within 
the scope of a general legislation but is regulated by sector specific rules and self-
regulation (Banisar and Davies, 1999, p. 13-14; Long and Quek, 2002, p. 330 and Levin 
and Nicholson, 2005, p. 362. See also C.A. Ciocchetti, 2008, p. 1-45). In order to make 
this system adequate, additional guarantees were needed in the shape of the so-called 
Safe Harbour compromise funded on the principles of notice, choice, onward trans-
fer, security, data integrity, access and enforcement (Safe Harbour Privacy Principles 
issued by the US Department of Commerce, 21 July 2000). The compromise largely 
consists of a choice for private companies to either enter into a self-regulatory privacy 
program that meets the terms of these seven principles, either design their own self-
regulatory privacy procedure on the condition that the Safe Harbour principles are 
complied with (Long and Quek, 2002, p. 325-344).
2.2 The adequacy requirement: not generally binding and diverse implementation
The provisions on requiring an adequate level of data protection in the third state 
concerned, are aimed at protecting the recognized standards outside the external bor-
ders of Europe. Assessing the standards utilized in the receiving state or authority 
can ensure an appropriate level of data protection after the exchange. This means 
that the basic principles for data protection valid in the EU are scrutinized as to the 
extent they are complied with in the receiving state or authority. Two points of view 
should be taken into consideration here, firstly the case in which an EU member state 
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authority wishes to send personal data to a third state or authority and secondly the 
case in which the EU bodies Europol or Eurojust want to make such transfer. In both 
cases, the assessment can be made on a case-by-case basis or for an entire state or 
institution.
2.2.1 Member states
When EU member states’ authorities receive a request from a third state or authority 
for personal data to be transferred, the adequacy requirement is applicable when the 
requested state has ratified the additional protocol to the data protection convention. 
This protocol specifies the necessity of an assessment of the level of data protection to 
be offered by the receiving third state or authority. However, this provision does not 
include detailed rules on how to carry out the assessment.
Nonetheless, it is clear that in order to maintain data quality standards when giving 
personal data into the hands of an authority that is not bound by the same standards, 
the criterion of adequacy functions as the umbrella concept of an appropriate level 
of data protection. The basic principles encompassed by the data protection conven-
tion – more specifically in Chapter II of the convention – must be taken into account 
while assessing the adequacy of the third states’ legal framework on data processing. 
Unfortunately, the explanatory report states that this clarification is only valid as far as 
these principles are relevant for the specific case of transfer (ETS no. 181, 8 November 
2001, Explanatory report, §29).
This allows for differences in evaluation tools and methods as well as items – such 
as the data quality standards – included in the evaluation, to result in divergent out-
comes depending on the state carrying out the assessment. From the point of view 
of the third state that requests personal data from two states that have ratified the 
additional protocol, this can lead to a different reply from each state (European Data 
Protection Supervisor (further: EDPS), O.J.C 26 April 2007, issue 91, p. 12 and EDPS, 
O.J.C, 23 June 2007, issue 139, p. 6). Hence, as long as no uniform checklist of the 
minimum provisions covered by an adequate level of data protection is available, this 
could lead to data-shopping.
To allow for some flexibility on the part of the exchanging states, the additional 
protocol provides in derogations from the adequacy requirement, that should be inter-
preted restrictively. National law must first of all provide in the transfer. Additionally, 
the transfer of personal data is only permitted when legitimate interests – especially 
important public interests – prevail over the lack of an adequate level of data protec-
tion. Not coincidentally, the explanatory report refers to the same interests based on 
which the right to privacy and the data quality principles can be lawfully derogated 
from (ETS no. 181, 8 November 2001, Explanatory report, §31).
Apart from the allowed derogations, in case an adequate level of data protection 
cannot be assured another possibility for exchange exists if the receiving state provides 
in sufficient safeguards such as the Safe Harbour compromise. The latter could never-
theless seem to amount to requiring adequacy. However, the safeguards could be lim-
ited to only the relevant elements of data protection (ETS no. 181, 8 November 2001, 
Explanatory report, §32-33). This means that the safeguards should be customized to 
the case – i.e. the tie between requested and requesting party which could be a contract 
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or an agreement between states or institutions – and do not have to encompass all 
principles included in the EU standards on data protection.
Nevertheless, so far only sixteen member states have ratified and are thus bound by 
the protocol. EU member states are only bound to comply with the adequacy require-
ment in criminal matters when they belong to this group of sixteen states or when 
they have provided this rule in their national legislation on data protection in criminal 
matters. The few member states that have – on their own initiative – widened the 
scope of their legislation implementing Directive 95/46/EC to include criminal mat-
ters, will also be bound by the adequacy requirement. Nonetheless, the requirement of 
checking the adequacy of the receiving data protection system is thus not a generally 
binding requirement in the EU.
2.2.2 Eurojust and Europol
The EU institutions involved in data exchange with the national judicial and law 
enforcement authorities, Eurojust respectively Europol, have developed their own data 
protection regulations. Equally here, the picture is diverse.
The Decision setting up Eurojust provides in the adequacy requirement for the data 
transfers to a third state or body (Council, O.J.L 6 June 2002, issue 63, p. 1-13). Without 
an assessment of this third state or third body’s data protection system, Eurojust is 
not allowed to transfer personal data. Referring to the data protection convention, the 
assessment of the level of protection shall be made in the light of all the circumstances 
for each transfer or category of transfers. In order to make a complete evaluation, all 
elements of the transfer should be included, i.e. the type of data, the purposes and 
duration of processing for which the data are transferred, the country of origin and the 
country of final destination, the general and sectoral rules of law applicable in the state 
or organisation in question, the professional and security rules which are applicable 
there, as well as the existence of sufficient safeguards put in place by the recipient of 
the transfer. The assessment is made by Eurojust’s data protection officer and only 
involves the Joint Supervisory Body (further: JSB) when difficulties are met during 
the process. The amended decision on strengthening Eurojust does not add to these 
provisions in order to improve the assessment (Council, 5347/09, 20 January 2009), 
even though the European Data Protection Supervisor has called upon the Council to 
use this opportunity to introduce the approval of the JSB in the procedure (European 
Data Protection Supervisor, 9013/08, 7 May 2008, §36).
In comparison with Europol, however, the set of rules governing the adequacy 
check for Eurojust’s third state transfers is not particularly detailed (Council, O.J.C 30 
March 1999, issue 88, p. 1-3.
With the exception of urgent circumstances, a four-step filter needs to be passed to 
conclude an agreement with a third state or body. This filter starts with a report by the 
Management Board stating that no obstacles exist to start negotiations. The JSB needs 
to be consulted on this subject as well. During this stage, a first check of the third state 
or body’s data protection system can already be made as the JSB protects the rights of 
the individual regarding the processing of data by Europol.
Subsequently, a unanimous decision by the Council is needed (Council, O.J.C 13 
April 2000, issue 106, p. 1-2). During this stage, a second check of the third state’s 
data protection is made as the Council should consider the law and the administrative 
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practice of the third state or body in the field of data protection, including the authority 
responsible for data protection matters.
In a third step, the Director will start negotiations, after which the Management 
Board and the JSB will need to give their approval to conclude the agreement in a final 
step (de HerT and de scHuTTer, 2008, p. 319-320).
The only cases in which this four-step approach is not followed, are the exceptional 
cases in which Europol’s Director considers the transfer of the data absolutely neces-
sary to safeguard the essential interests of the member states concerned within the 
scope of Europol’s objectives or in the interests of preventing imminent danger associ-
ated with crime. The adequacy evaluation should be done by the Director and supervi-
sion is then limited to a post-transfer check and only on request of the Management 
Board and the JSB.
This implies the responsibility of the Director to evaluate the level of data protec-
tion supported by the third state or body before making his decision, instead of the 
lengthy four-step process. An explicit requirement to verify the adequacy of the receiv-
ing state or body’s data protection system is not included.
Providing in an option of a post-transfer check of adequacy as opposed to a prior 
evaluation by several bodies, means that in cases where the level of data protection 
would be considered not to be adequate, this could only affect possible future transfers 
to that same third state or body instead of blocking a currently planned transfer.
When the recently adopted Europol Decision (Council, 8478/09, 6 April 2009) 
enters into force, the four-layered adequacy check remains intact as a general rule for 
transfers to third states or bodies.
In exceptional cases however, the aforementioned implied adequacy check is given 
a new meaning. The obligation for the Director to consider the data-protection system 
of the receiving body in question should be carried out with a view to balance the 
data-protection level and the interests protected by the transfer. This means that the 
adequacy requirement does not need to be fulfilled, a fortiori is derogated from in an 
unspecified manner (EDPS, O.J.C 27 October 2007, issue 255, § 29).
2.2.3 Inconsistent requirement
Even with the sensitivity that is inherent to the field of criminal matters, the require-
ment of adequacy is not laid down for every transfer of personal data that can be made 
for purposes of prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution. In addition to 
the lack of a standard requirement for outbound data transfer, the adequacy rule is 
not uniformly employed either. The latter is visible on two levels. Firstly, a checklist of 
data protection rules that should minimally be evaluated while making the adequacy 
assessment is not provided by the EU. Secondly, while Europol has developed a multi-
level adequacy assessment, Eurojust relies on its data protection officer. This means in 
practice that an individual can see his or her personal data transferred from a member 
state to a third state and being used in that particular third state for incompatible 
purposes. For example, an individual’s personal data on receiving a weapon permit in 
a member state could be transferred to the third state and used against this person in a 
custody case. Additionally, due to the lack of uniform assessment systems, this exam-
ple could be reality when dealing with one third state but not with the other. Obviously, 
this opens the door to unjustified discriminating between identical cases.
GOFS 4.indd   101 15-01-2010   16:24:39
Topical issues in eu and inTernaTional crime conTrol
102 Maklu 
The new framework decision on data protection in criminal matters could have 
ensured more coherency in the EU’s third pillar by answering to these concerns.
3 Inadequacy based on purpose deviation
One of the elements in need of particular consideration when assessing the adequate 
level of data protection is the compliance with the purpose limitation principle (article 
13, §4 of the framework decision on data protection in criminal matters). The principle 
restricting the use of personal data to the purpose they were gathered for or a compat-
ible purpose should also be complied with by the receiving state or authority. Given 
the – often significant – differences between the structure of states’ criminal justice 
systems and the competences of their respective authorities, living up to the purpose 
limitation rule is particularly important when transferring personal data to a third 
state. In view of the EU’s cooperation in criminal matters with the United States (fur-
ther: the US) and the agreements concluded between the EU, Europol and Eurojust 
on the one hand and the US on the other hand, the adequacy of the American data 
protection level should have been tested, including the purpose limitation rule.
3.1 Purpose limitation to purpose deviation
Personal data should be stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a 
way incompatible with those purposes. Thus, personal data should only be processed 
for purposes identical to the purpose they were gathered for or a compatible purpose. 
This principle of purpose limitation has been laid down in the data protection conven-
tion and was copied into Directive 95/46 for activities of Community law. Purpose 
limitation incorporates an aspect of foreseeability by the data subject who should be 
in a position to anticipate in which cases his or her personal data can be gathered and 
in which cases these data can be processed and by whom (European Court of Human 
Rights (further: ECtHR), Leander v. Sweden, 1987, § 48 and ECtHR, Rotaru v. Romania, 
2000, § 46 and European Data Protection Supervisor (further: EDPS), O.J.C, 23 June 
2007, issue 139, § 20; see also Bygrave, 2002, p. 337-341). In other words, personal data 
gathered for the purpose of commercial activities should not be used for purposes 
incompatible with commercial activities, such as prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of criminal offences. If that is the case, the data subject did not have 
the opportunity to react – read: object – against the final purpose for which the data 
are processed. Still, in cases that this is necessary for a legitimate goal and laid down 
by law, the deviation from the original purpose is allowed.
The purpose limitation principle thus leaves room for the use of personal data for 
other purposes than the initial purpose, as long as there is compatibility between the 
two or as long as the conditions for allowed derogations are fulfilled. Nevertheless, 
this possibility is stretched to a point where there is no compatibility between the 
original purpose of gathering and the final purpose of processing the data (De Busser, 
2009a, p. 163-193). This development to purpose deviation rather than purpose limita-
tion seen in the EU’s instruments on data exchange between the law enforcement 
and judicial authorities of the member states as well as data exchange within the EU 
involving Europol and Eurojust.
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In several legal instruments, personal data gathered for EC-related purposes are 
used in criminal matters. In administrative investigations conducted by the EC’s 
anti-fraud unit OLAF, personal data that are discovered should be secured and the 
case left to the competent judicial authorities. The OLAF decision thus provides a 
formalized purpose deviation from the OLAF investigation to national authori-
ties (European Parliament and Council, O.J.L 31 May 1999, issue 136, p. 1-7). Even 
between Eurojust and OLAF an agreement on the transfer of personal data has been 
signed (Practical Agreement on arrangements of cooperation between Eurojust and 
OLAF, 24 September 2008). For both types of transfer of personal data from OLAF 
no lawful derogation to the purpose limitation rule can be called upon to justify the 
transfer between the first and third pillar.
Other paths have been opened for Eurojust as well as Europol to gain access to 
personal data that have not been gathered for the purpose of criminal matters. New 
developments in the Schengen Information System (further: SIS) – the so-called SIS 
II that should be operational by the end of 2009 – create opportunities for Eurojust, 
Europol and for law enforcement authorities to access the database that was originally 
designed for border management purposes (Council, 14914/06, 12 December 2006). 
Initially intended to broaden the capacity of the existing SIS in order to pave the way 
for new member states to join, the momentum was used to introduce new functions 
to the system including these new access rights (Council, O.J.L 7 August 2007, issue 
205, p. 63-84). The requirements for a lawful derogation from the purpose limitation 
rule are however fulfilled.
In the same spirit, the Commission experienced the lack of law enforcement access 
to Visa Information System (further: VIS) as a shortcoming and a serious gap in the 
identification of suspected perpetrators of a serious crime (Commission, COM(2005) 
597 final, 24 November 2005, p. 6). This was realized in the 2008 decision granting 
designated authorities and Europol access to the VIS even though it was designed to 
establish a common identification system for visa data in the context of a common 
visa policy for the member states, thus not for any purpose related to criminal matters 
(Council, Decision, O.J.L 13 August 2008, issue 218, p. 129-136). Additionally, due to 
the delineating of the authorities by means of a functional criterion, equally intelli-
gence services could legally have access to VIS (EDPS, O.J.C 25 April 2006, issue 97, p. 
9). The necessity requirement should thus be strictly complied with in order to fulfill 
the conditions of a lawful derogation to the purpose limitation rule.
Granting access to law enforcement authorities to the Eurodac database that was 
developed as a fingerprint database for asylum purposes, touches upon a similar 
issue (Council, 11004/07, 19 June 2007 and Council, 11004/07 COR 1, 2 July 2007; 
Standing Committee of Experts on International Immigration, Refugee and Criminal 
law, CM0712-IV, 18 September 2007).
Finally, the data retention directive of 2006 obliges telecommunication providers 
to save certain types of personal data for the purposes of investigation, detection and 
prosecution of serious crime (European Parliament and Council, O.J.L 13 April 2006, 
issue 105, p. 54-63). This equally means a transfer from the first to the third pillar 
demonstrating purpose deviation rather than purpose limitation.
It is thus a well-established development in the law enforcement and judicial coop-
eration in criminal matters between the EU member states, to move into the direction 
of purpose deviation. Even though purpose limitation is one of the basic principles of 
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data protection and should thus unquestionably be part of an adequate level of data 
protection in a third state, it is in the same way left when we look at the EU’s coopera-
tion in criminal matters with the United States.
3.2 Adequacy of the American level of data protection
Concluding on the adequacy level of the US data protection system from an EU point 
of view is challenging due to the different structure of the American data protection 
system as opposed to the EU’s legal framework on data protection (see elaborately De 
Busser, 2009b, p. 282-291). Where the EU’s data protection standards are based on an 
umbrella instrument – the CoE’s data protection convention – that has been ratified 
by all member states, the US relies on a combination of sector specific legislation, 
self-regulation by companies and technologies of privacy (Banisar and Davies, 1999, p. 
13-14 and Long and Quek, 2002, p. 330). Not only are data protection laws differently 
structured, also privacy policies in the EU and the US have slightly divergent politi-
cal and social foundations (Whitman, 2004, p. 1151-1252). Even though the theories 
concerning these different mindsets could explain and illustrate the situation of data 
protection in transatlantic relations today and are therefore relevant, they are not the 
focal point of this contribution.
With regard to the quality of personal data as such, the US starts from the principle 
of accuracy, relevance and adequacy of personal data. However, the many exceptions to 
the rule and exemptions made from it, take away the quality of the data. For example, 
the US Privacy Act explicitly allows law enforcement and intelligence agencies to be 
exempted from the accuracy check of personal data, unless the data are disclosed to 
another person than an agency and the data are not asked by means of an request 
based on the Freedom of Information Act (5 USC §552a; 5 USC §552 and Department 
of Justice, Overview of the Privacy Act of 1974, 2004 edition, www.usdoj.gov/oip 
/04_7_1.html). Thus, for an interagency transfer of data, the accuracy standard can be 
disregarded. Furthermore, the necessity of these exceptions is not motivated and the 
conditions for lawful derogations are not met.
With regard to the quality of the processing of personal data, the purpose limi-
tation principle does not appear in the US data protection legislation as a general 
binding rule. This is not problematic as such since many separate provisions apply. 
However, similar to the EU legal instruments on cooperation in criminal matters, 
many examples of purpose deviation can be found. Yet, the US deviates from the 
purpose limitation principle in a different way than the EU. Where the EU opens the 
use of data after they have been gathered, the US lowers the standards at the moment 
of data collection.
Firstly, data can be gathered for intelligence purposes and subsequently used for 
law enforcement purposes. This way, evidence can be introduced in criminal proceed-
ings when it was in fact gathered by using the lower standard of intelligence investiga-
tions. The use of administrative subpoenas and national security letters are examples 
of this technique. For administrative subpoenas, only the possibility of judicial review 
and a reasonability standard are required (C. Doyle, 2006, p. 2-3). For national security 
letters, judicial review is not even provided. As long as there is reason to believe that 
the person or entity on whom information is sought was or may have been a foreign 
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power or an agent thereof (Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, 13 May 2002, 
p. 7 and C. Doyle, 2008, p. 1-5).
Secondly, investigative techniques that were originally meant for criminal inves-
tigations opened for intelligence investigations. This method equally means the use 
of a technique that, due to its privacy violating character, should be subject to the 
constitutional requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, the standard 
is reduced and the data can eventually be used in criminal proceedings. A physical 
search of private premises should be conducted by applying the Fourth Amendment’s 
rules, however this is brought under the scope of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(further: FISA) (50 USC § 1801 et seq.). The same is valid for the collecting of business 
records and other tangible objects, by means of the so-called Patriot Act amending 
FISA (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot Act), Public Law no. 107-56, October 26 
2001).
Additionally, the US has a well-established tradition of sharing data among agen-
cies and authorities. An example of this information sharing environment can be 
found in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 
no. 108-458, 17 December 2004) and in the notorious FISA. The latter opened up the 
wall between the intelligence community and law enforcement authorities by provid-
ing in the use of the results from warrantless electronic surveillances for the purpose 
of criminal proceedings (See also Vervaele, 2005).
With just a few examples shortly assessed from an EU point of view but based 
on earlier research (De Busser, 2009b, p. 282-291), we demonstrate the lack of an 
adequate level of data protection in the American system of personal data processing 
for the purposes of the detection, investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. 
It is therefore remarkable to see that the EU, Europol as well as Eurojust have rub-
ber stamped this requirement of adequacy instead of making a comprehensive and 
thorough examination.
3.3 Transatlantic purpose deviation
The EU, Europol and Eurojust have concluded agreements with the US covering the 
exchange of personal data in criminal matters. The heightened attention for interna-
tional cooperation in criminal matters after 9/11 had profound consequences on the 
EU-US relations in the shape of these new instruments. One would thus expect that 
the adequacy requirement should be complied with and that an assessment of the 
level of data protection in the US should be available for these agreements. However, 
this is not the case. On the contrary, the adequacy requirement was negotiated off the 
table in all three instruments.
The first outcome of the need for data exchange in the transatlantic connection, 
were the 2001 and 2002 Europol – US agreements. Without any conclusion on the 
adequacy of the US data protection system, Europol started negotiations assuming 
that the US was an adequate partner regarding personal data protection. The Europol 
Joint Supervisory Body (further: JSB) even stated that Europol was unable to express an 
opinion on the adequacy of the US data protection regime (Europol JSB, 26 November 
2001, p. 2). Still, agreements between Europol and other third states – Australia, 
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Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland – include an adequacy assessment. 
This was therefore not done for the US.
On the contrary, the 2002 Europol-US agreement included a provision that received 
an interpretation was not seen before in instruments on cooperation in criminal mat-
ters. The provisions stating that a ‘party to which a request for assistance under the 
agreement shall endeavor to limit the circumstances in which it refuses or postpones 
assistance to the greatest extent possible’ should – in accordance with the explanatory 
note – be interpreted as a prohibition on ‘generic restrictions’ (Council, 13696/1/02, 28 
November 2002). The adequacy requirement as one of the basic requirements of the 
EU data protection framework, more specifically the transfer to third states, is hereby 
negotiated out of the scope of this agreement.
In addition, the 2002 agreement concerned the exchange of personal data between 
Europol and the US and included a purpose limitation provision that was much wider 
than what the EU was used to (Supplemental Agreement between the Europol Police 
Office and the United States of America on the exchange of personal data and related 
information, 20 December 2002). Especially the interpretation given to the provision 
in the exchange of notes – including immigration and confiscation proceedings – sub-
stantially widened the possible use that could be made of exchanged data (Council, 
13996/02, 11 November 2002).
In the 2006 Eurojust-US Agreement (Agreement between Eurojust and the United 
States of America, 6 November 2006) similar developments are seen with regard to the 
purpose limitation principle as well as with regard to the adequacy requirement. Since 
Eurojust has cooperation agreements with states that have ratified the data protection 
convention – Iceland, Romania, Norway and Croatia – the adequacy requirement was 
not necessary to fulfill here. However, this was not the case for the US. The coop-
eration agreement between Eurojust and the US needed to be complemented with 
a decision on the adequacy of the American data protection level. Yet, no adequacy 
assessment was made which seemed to not even make the Eurojust JSB bat an eyelid 
(Joint Supervisory Body of Eurojust, Activity Report 2006, p. 7).
A similar widely formulated purpose limitation rule was applied in the EU-US 
mutual legal assistance agreement of 2003. Based on articles 24 and 38 TEU, this was 
done for the first time as a group of member states rather than as separate states (O.J.L 
19 July 2003, issue 181, p. 34-42). This agreement should – together with the bilateral 
written instruments developed by the member states – enter into force in 2009.
The adequacy requirement did not make it into the text of the agreement. One 
could state that the additional protocol to the data protection convention did not enter 
into force before 2004 and there were no other binding instruments applicable to the 
EU member states at the time that prescribed this condition for exchanging personal 
data in criminal matters. However, the adequacy requirement was already included in 
the additional protocol that was opened for signature in 2001. Thus, the negotiating 
parties could have anticipated to it and could have included it in the discussions on 
the content of the mutual legal assistance agreement. Additionally, the requirement 
was well known from data exchanges outside the field of criminal matters, such as the 
aforementioned Safe harbour Principles following the Directive 95/46/EC. In spite 
of many assessments on data protection systems of other third states, the US seems 
to continuously escape this additional safeguard by acquiring the assumption that its 
data protection is satisfactory by EU standards.
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The purpose limitation rule was equally in this agreement widened to include other 
purposes. Not included in any of the existing bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties 
(further: MLATs) between EU member states and the US, the wider rule will replace 
the existing use limitation provisions in these agreements and will be introduced in 
the relations with member states that did not have an MLAT with the US yet. The 
speciality rule that was a traditional part of the MLATs and protected the states’ inter-
ests is pushed aside (Vermeulen, 2004, p. 103). However, the data subject’s interests 
cannot be considered to enjoy a high level of data protection either due to width of the 
new rule. In accordance with the new rule, data can be used for unspecified purposes 
if the requested state – not the data subject – gives its consent. The necessity of this 
exception to the purpose limitation rule is not clarified.
Purposes for which data can be used are equally widened in specific agreements 
that have been concluded in order to make the transfer of data between US authorities 
and EU companies possible. Data gathered for commercial purposes in the EU and 
transferred and used by US administrative authorities in the fight against terrorism 
and the financing of terrorism, was the issue in both the case on the transfer of pas-
senger name record (further: PNR) data and the SWIFT case (see also De Busser, 
2009a, p. 187-191). In both cases, the relevant US authorities agreed to make commit-
ments regarding the protection of the received data. However, the sharing of data with 
authorities is a possibility with regard to PNR data (Council, 13738/06, 11 October 
2006 and Council, O.J.L 4 August 2007, issue 204). The EU agreed to the undertak-
ings by the US on sharing the received data with authorities competent for public 
security related cases, without a clear necessity indication. In the SWIFT case, the 
EU also agreed to allow for the data transfer to the US Treasury under the condition 
of a specific purpose limitation that keeps the use of the data within the limits of ter-
rorist financing investigations and prosecutions. However, it is still an administrative 
authority receiving commercially gathered personal data for the purpose of criminal 
investigations and prosecutions.
Purpose limitation is thus not a principle that is equally valued in the EU and in the 
US. The High Level Contact Group (further: HLCG), a group of senior officials from 
both sides established to enhance the transatlantic data exchange for law enforcement 
purposes, attempted to lay down common definitions on key principles (Council, 
9831/08, 28 May 2008). The HLCG agreed on the principle that personal data should 
be processed for specific legitimate law enforcement purposes, in accordance with the 
law and subsequently processed only insofar as this is not incompatible with the law 
enforcement purpose of the original collection of the personal information. However, 
the group overlooked the fact that the term ‘law enforcement’ encompasses a differ-
ent landscape of authorities in the EU than it does in the US. The US interprets law 
enforcement to include border enforcement, public security and national security 
purposes as well as for non-criminal judicial or administrative proceedings related 
directly to such offences or violations (EDPS, 11 November 2008, p. 13 and 9831/08, 
28 May 2008, p. 4). The title ‘common principle’ is therefore quite inappropriate.
3.4 Inadequate transatlantic cooperation in criminal matters
Similar to the evolution visible in the EU Legal instruments providing in judicial or 
law enforcement data exchange, the EU-US cooperation in criminal matters moves 
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into a clear direction of purpose deviation rather than purpose limitation. Still, it is 
remarkable that this cooperation was established in the first place due to the lack of an 
examination of the American level of data protection.
The adequacy requirement was not complied with in the three agreements that have 
been concluded between Europol, Eurojust and the EU on the one hand and the US 
on the other hand. A fortiori, the prerequisite that should safeguard our data protection 
standards in criminal justice systems that are not bound by the data protection con-
vention, is eliminated from these agreements in favour of what is called a smoother 
exchange of data. Even where the requirement is lived up to in the relations with other 
third states, the US receives the ‘approved’ rubber stamp without passing the test of 
providing in adequate data protection.
There is thus no coherency in the application of the adequacy requirement. On the 
contrary, demanding an adequate level of data protection seems to function as an 
obstacle rather than as a mechanism of protection, at least in the transatlantic relations 
in criminal matters. This means that the safeguarding of the European standards on 
data protection is not appropriately protected in outbound data exchange.
4 The significance of the adequacy requirement in the framework 
decision
The new framework decision on data protection in criminal matters includes provi-
sions on data processing within the external borders of the EU and provisions on 
transfers of personal data crossing these borders (O.J.L 30 December 2008, issue 350, 
p. 60-71).
Four conditions are provided in the framework decision for allowing a transfer 
to a third state of body. Firstly, the transfer needs to be necessary for the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of crimi-
nal penalties and secondly, the receiving authority should be responsible for these 
tasks. Thirdly, the providing member state needs to have given its consent. Fourthly, 
the third state or body needs to ensure an adequate level of data protection. The latter 
can however be derogated from.
The content of the instrument is on several aspects rather disappointing from a 
data protection point of view. With regard to the quality of the processing of personal 
data, the applicable provisions have been widely formulated and seem to aim for pur-
pose deviation rather than purpose limitation (De Busser, 2009a, p. 163-201). With 
regard to the transfer to third states or institutions, the adopted provisions confirm 
the incoherence in the judicial and law enforcement cooperation in criminal matters 
between the EU member states on the one hand and third states or institutions on the 
other hand.
This incoherence is substantiated by means of three aspects of the framework 
decision: the limited weight that is attached to the adequacy requirement, the limited 
scope of the instrument and the effect that the framework decision has on existing and 
future provisions on data transfers to third states and institutions.
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4.1 The weight of the adequacy requirement in the framework decision
Article 13 of the framework decision on the transfer to competent authorities in third 
states or to international bodies provides that the third state or international body 
concerned ensures an adequate level of protection for the intended data processing. 
Nevertheless, more requirements – that cumulatively need to be fulfilled – apply.
Earlier drafts of the provisions on the transfer to third states and bodies included 
the requirement of consent by the transmitting member state or authority as the only 
requirement to be fulfilled (Council, 7215/07, 13 March 2007). The Council however 
paid attention to the remarks made by the European Data Protection Supervisor and 
raised the conditions to a level much more in line with the provisions of the additional 
protocol (EDPS, O.J.C, 23 June 2007, issue 139, § 27-28). Consent of the state from 
which the data were obtained was made one of the four conditions to be fulfilled 
subject to derogations. The other two conditions include the purpose of the exchange 
for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties and the responsibility of the receiving authority or 
body for these tasks.
Not responding to the concerns of the EDPS, the framework decision does not 
encompass more detailed indications of how to – uniformly – assess the adequacy of 
a state’s data protection legislation, than the circumstances given by the additional 
protocol to the data protection convention.
Similarly, the lawful derogations from the adequacy requirement are a copy of the 
latter. Based on its origin in the additional protocol the legitimate prevailing interests 
should refer to article 8, § 2 of the ECHR and article 9, §2 of the data protection conven-
tion, including state security, public safety, health and morals and the economic well-
being of the state. Obviously, these leave plenty of room for more specific interests of 
the state to fit in one category or the other. Specifically the interests of state security can 
– nevertheless legitimate and prevailing – cause a shift of personal data gathered for 
criminal purposes to use for administrative purposes. This can be done while jumping 
over the requirement of an adequacy check, thus releasing the data into a legal system 
of which the data protection provisions are possibly not adequate in comparison to the 
EU standards. This provision in particular is in need of more clarification by means of 
an exhaustive list, a supervisory authority that judges the legitimacy and the prevailing 
force of a specific interest or by laying down standards on when to consider an interest 
as prevailing over the adequacy check of a data protection system.
As a copy of the additional protocol to the data protection convention, the com-
ment that these derogations are broadly formulated is equally valid for the framework 
decision as well as for the protocol. Nevertheless, the protocol is in general applica-
ble to all automatic data processing and was not designed to protect personal data in 
criminal matters. Furthermore, where the states ratifying the additional protocol are 
bound to provide in the adequacy requirement, they have the discretion to determine 
derogations to the rule. Therefore, implementing the principles from the protocol in 
criminal matters, the derogations of the protocol leave too much room for avoiding 
the adequacy assessment. Particularly since the significance of purpose limitation is 
considered as one of the basic data protection principles supported by the EU and 
encompassed by an adequate level of data protection, the use of these derogations can 
have wide-ranging implications.
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Thus, the structure and content of article 13 of the framework decision is not new, 
neither surprising. What is surprising, however, is the fact that these provisions are 
limited to data transmitted or made available by a member state to another member in 
order to transfer them to a third state or body. It is therefore not aimed at, neither does 
it include, data that were gathered by the transmitting member state itself.
Together with the effects of the framework decision on the existing and future 
provisions on outgoing data transfers, the content of article 13 results in anything but 
a substantial adequacy requirement for the third pillar.
4.2 The scope of the framework decision
The formal scope of the framework decision is identical to the Directive 95/46/EC 
as it includes the processing of data wholly or partly by automatic means, and to the 
processing otherwise than by automatic means, of personal data which form part of a 
filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system (article 1, §3). The defini-
tion of ‘filing system’ is evidently identical to the one included in the Directive.
The material scope however, covers a part of the exceptions in article 3 §2 of the 
Directive and has been delineated by means of a functional criterion. Instead of 
delineating the authorities that are or are not included, for example law enforcement 
authorities or judicial authorities, the competent authorities are defined by Title VI of 
the TEU and the authorities that are authorized by national law to process personal 
data within the scope of the framework decision (article 2, h). This refers to authorities 
that are competent to process personal data for the purpose of prevention, investiga-
tion, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penal-
ties.
Which activities are exactly included in the prevention, detection, investigation 
and prosecution of criminal offences and the execution of criminal penalties, is not 
provided by the definitions of the framework decision. Nevertheless, the link with 
criminal offences ensures that also the processing of personal data proactively can be 
included.
After elaborate discussions the Council decided to limit the Framework Decision 
to cross-border exchange of personal data and not include domestic exchange (Council 
(Justice and Home Affairs), 12604/07, 18 September 2007 and EDPS, Press release, 
20 September 2007, www.edps.europa.eu). The resistance of a number of member 
states – lead by the United Kingdom – to the application of the framework decision to 
domestic data processing, finally made the Council give up on its original scope as no 
consensus would be reached (Council, 12154/07, 4 September 2007, p. 2 and peers, 
2007, p. 2).
This means that data that have been collected by the member states’ authorities 
do not fall within the scope of the framework decisions and thus are not subjected to 
the adequacy requirement when this member state transfers the data to a third state 
or body. Instead, the transfer of these data is subjected to national law. Only in case 
the member state concerned has ratified the additional protocol to the data protection 
convention or has included the adequacy requirement through an implementation of 
Directive 95/46/EC in criminal matters, should the adequacy requirement be applied 
to the outgoing data transfers.
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Therefore, the framework decision creates a discrimination between the personal 
data that have been collected by the member state and the personal data that have 
been transferred or made available by another member state. Data included in crimi-
nal investigation files can consist partially of nationally gathered data and partially 
of received data. When data from the file are requested for the purpose of a criminal 
investigation or procedure in a third state, the data that are included in the file have to 
be distinguished regarding their origin. Thus, data in the same file can be subjected to 
two different sets of data protection rules. In case the receiving criminal justice system 
is evaluated as being inadequate, the nationally gathered data of the same file can be 
exchanged where the received data can not.
This distinction could even create grounds for an evaluation of the framework deci-
sion by the Court of Justice by means of a prejudicial question and the competence of 
the Court to rule upon the validity of framework decisions (article 35, §1 TEU). By anal-
ogy with the case brought before the Belgian Constitutional Court by the non-profit 
organization ‘Advocaten voor de Wereld’ regarding the European Arrest Warrant, the 
framework decision on data protection in criminal matters could be judged on this 
discriminatory aspect (Court of Justice, C-303/05, 3 May 2007). Because the distinc-
tion made between nationally gathered data and data received or made available by 
another member state is not objectively justified, the Constitutional Court could refer 
the case to the Court of Justice. In the case regarding the European Arrest Warrant, the 
relevant difference – requirement of double criminality for all offences not included in 
the list in framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant – was according to the 
Court objectively justified due to the seriousness of the offences included in the list.
A distinction based on objective aspects of the data cannot be made with regard 
to the personal data gathered nationally or received from another member state. On 
the contrary, limiting the scope of the framework decision was a choice inspired by 
national policy. Applying the instrument only to cross-border exchange was the ada-
mant position of ‘a substantial number of delegations’ of the member states (Council, 
12154/07, 4 September 2007).
4.3 Effects of the framework decision on existing and future provisions
Similar to the instruments applicable on data exchange between member states, the 
entry into force of the framework decision on data protection in criminal matters also 
has significant effects on the instruments on the exchange of personal data with third 
states.
Article 26 of the framework decision lays down the general rule that existing bilat-
eral and multilateral agreements between the member states or the Union on the one 
hand and third states on the other hand, are unaffected by the framework decision. 
Future agreements should comply with the new instrument, specifically with article 
13 on transfers to third states and international bodies. This particular article will nev-
ertheless also play an important part in the existing bi- and multilateral agreements 
as the requirement of consent in the provision – §1, c) or §2 as appropriate – must be 
applied to these agreements as well.
The already concluded instruments will still be applicable in their original form, 
even though with the addition of a consent requirement. This means that no agree-
ments need to be renegotiated and obtained clauses will remain in force. Besides the 
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significance for the political ties that the member states as well as the Union have 
built up with third states, legal certainty is ensured by not touching acquired rights 
and obligations after the adoption of the framework decision. The addition of the con-
sent requirement means that with regard to the concluded data exchange by virtue 
of existing bi- and multilateral instruments, the member state that supplied the data 
now also needs to give its consent for the transfer to the third state. However, the 
requirement can be derogated from in cases in which the consent cannot be obtained 
in good time and the transfer is essential. The necessity is motivated by the prevention 
of an immediate and serious threat to public security of a member state or third state 
or to essential interests of a member state. Due to the width of this derogation, the 
consent requirement is thus not the type of additional requirement that would impede 
the functioning of an already existing agreement. Therefore, the relationships of data 
exchange with third states that are effective at the time of the entry into force of the 
framework decision are secured.
The requirement of ensuring an adequate level of data protection remains 
untouched where it has been included in existing agreements. As mentioned before, 
the requirement has not been included in all legal instruments related to data exchange 
in criminal matters.
Also unaffected by the framework decision, is the additional protocol to the data 
protection convention. This means that the adequacy requirement the ratifying states 
are bound by in their data exchange with states not bound by the data protection con-
vention, stays afloat pursuant to recital 41 of the preamble.
Important to note is that article 26 of the framework decision explicitly refers to 
‘obligations and commitments incumbent upon Member States or upon the Union 
by virtue of bilateral and/or multilateral agreements with third States existing at the 
time of adoption of this Framework Decision’. Consequently, it is not necessary for the 
agreements to have entered into force then. The obligations or commitments merely 
need to ‘exist’, which is a legally vague and undefined term. As obligations or com-
mitments cannot exist without the agreement being concluded, it would have been a 
much clearer rule to include the prerequisite of a signed agreement.
By only including member states and the Union, this means that the agreements 
concluded between Europol or Eurojust on the one hand and third states on the other 
hand, are not encompassed by the rule in article 26. Thus, these remain unaffected in 
their existing as well as in their future agreements with third states.
5 The future of adequacy: from Vienna to Stockholm via Washington
The history of the adequacy requirement dates back to the creation of the internal mar-
ket and the aforementioned Directive 95/46/EC. In criminal matters it has not been 
made a generally binding prerequisite for outgoing transfers of personal data. Recent 
developments have shown that this is not likely to happen in the future, even though 
significant efforts have been made to create a data protection framework for the third 
pillar. Nevertheless, in the judicial and law enforcement cooperation in criminal mat-
ters between the EU, Eurojust and Europol on the one hand and the US on the other 
hand, the adequacy requirement has become discredited.
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5.1 From Vienna to the Hague
The first call for a harmonisation of data protection rules under the title of judicial and 
police cooperation in criminal matters was made in the Vienna Action Plan in 1998 
(O.J.C 23 January 1999, issue 19, § 7 and § 47). Even though these plans were accom-
panied by an Italian initiative covering the same ideas on harmonising data protection 
in the third pillar, the first attempts to develop a legal instrument on data protection 
in criminal matters failed.
After the European Council refreshed the Council and the Commission’s memory 
in the Hague Programme, an Action Plan was set up to submit proposals for ensuring 
‘adequate safeguards and effective legal remedies for the transfer of personal data for 
the purpose of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters’. The new proposal 
drafted by the Commission in 2005 (Commission, COM(2005) 475 final, 4 October 
2005), failed to resolve a number of crucial questions. A new proposal was therefore 
presented by the German presidency in April 2007 (Council, 7315/1/07, Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision on the protection of personal data processed in 
the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, 24 April 2007). 
Nevertheless, the adequacy requirement did not undergo significant changes in these 
proposals. With the exception of the draft proposal of March 2007 where briefly the 
consent requirement was included as the only condition for making outgoing personal 
data transfers in criminal matters. In the following draft text the adequacy require-
ment was already restored in its former configuration as one of the conditions to be 
fulfilled.
Notwithstanding the current structure of the article on outgoing data transfers, 
the three aspects as examined above demonstrate that the adequacy requirement as 
it is included in the new framework decision does not entirely suit data protection in 
international cooperation in criminal matters to the best of its abilities. Looking at the 
manner in which the adequacy requirement is used in agreements with third states 
that cover data transfers in criminal matters, the picture is equally alarming concern-
ing the transatlantic cooperation.
5.2 The transatlantic journey
The cooperation in criminal matters between the EU and the US earns a specific spot 
in the discussion on the adequacy requirement. Before the conclusion of the 2003 
agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters between the EU and the 
US, the cooperation between judicial and law enforcement authorities in criminal 
matters was regulated by bilateral mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs). None 
of these MLATs include the adequacy requirement. The entry into force of the 2003 
mutual legal assistance agreement could have changed this as new bilateral instru-
ments needed to be developed in order to interpret the existing MLATs in the light of 
the agreement.
Research has shown that the American system of data protection in criminal mat-
ters is as such not fully compatible with the EU standards on data protection. The lack 
of generally binding rules on purpose limitation and data retention combined with 
the tradition of data sharing amongst government agencies, result in a data protection 
landscape that is too divergent from the EU legislation to be labelled as adequate with-
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out guaranteeing additional safeguards (De Busser, 2009a, p. 175-191. Regarding the 
differences between both systems see also Whitman, 2004, p. 1151-1221 and Harris, 
2007, p. 796-799). Nevertheless, this did not withhold Europol, Eurojust and the EU 
from concluding agreements covering the exchange of personal data with the US 
authorities.
5.3 Adequate transatlantic alliances in the future?
Approaching the end of the Hague Programme in 2010, the German presidency set 
up two informal working groups at ministerial level to discuss a successive plan on 
the future of European area of freedom, security and justice. The Informal High 
Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy (Future Group 
Home Affairs) on the one hand and the High-Level Advisory Group on the Future of 
European Justice Policy (Future Group Justice) on the other hand, considered the main 
challenges the EU would face in the period 2010-2014. These preparations would lead 
to the new Stockholm programme, the successor to the Hague plan that should be 
concluded during the Swedish presidency in the fall of 2009 (Vermeulen, 2009).
At that given time, the Council discussed the Framework Decision on the pro-
tection of personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial coopera-
tion in criminal matters and due to the focus on information exchange in the Hague 
Programme, the subject of data protection received much attention in both reports. 
The report of the Future Group on Justice continued largely along the data protection 
lines the EU had set out before. Introducing new ideas on transatlantic cooperation, 
including convergence of the different legal frameworks of data protection, the Future 
Group makes the assumption that the US endorses a data protection system that is 
compatible with the EU’s data protection regime. The Group goes as far as having a 
strong statement registered on a ‘Euro-Atlantic of cooperation with the United States 
in the field of Freedom, Security and Justice’. This implies an intense cooperation with 
a criminal justice system that is still fundamentally different from the EU’s crimi-
nal justice systems. In the preparatory report by the Future Group on Home Affairs 
already politically departed from the assumption that the US criminal justice system, 
including its data protection system, is sufficiently compatible to organize the same 
type of cooperation that exists between EU member states in the relations with the US. 
This means that the adequacy of the US data protection system is merely assumed, 
rather than thoroughly examined.
The Future Group introduced the concept of a Euro-Atlantic area of cooperation 
with the US in the field of freedom, security and justice. The Group hereby believes 
that the same principles that are applicable in the cooperation between EU member 
states, can be copied to the EU-US cooperation (Vermeulen, 2009). This would imply 
the application of the principle of mutual recognition to the EU-US relations. The 
basic conditions for mutual recognition – mutual trust and common minimum stand-
ards – are thus equally assumed, rather than thoroughly examined. In addition, these 
prerequisites for the principle of mutual recognition are not necessarily fulfilled in 
the internal cooperation between EU member states (Vernimmen-Van Tiggelen and 
Surano, 2008). As stated above, the current state of the art shows that the US are not 
compatible on a data protection level with the EU, even though the Future Group’s 
reasoning was based on compatibility between both systems.
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Chapter 2.3 of the Stockholm programme ends in a similar reasoning, by stating 
that the EU – US cooperation on data protection could serve as a basis for future 
Agreements. Taking a closer look at the content of Chapter 2.3 on protection of per-
sonal data and privacy, two statements are particularly eye-catching. On the one hand 
the Chapter highlights the need for a comprehensive protection scheme covering all 
areas of EU competence. On the other hand the Chapter ends with an impressive 
statement that bilateral and multilateral instruments could be based on the exam-
ple of the EU – US cooperation in data protection. Based on these statements, one 
could reason that the EU’s internal data protection is in need of improvement as basic 
principles need to be restated whereas the data protection in its transatlantic rela-
tions should serve as an example for international standards on data protection. The 
combination of these two statements included in the Stockholm Programme amounts 
to a glorification of the Agreements concluded between the EU and the US on the 
exchange of personal data.
In view of the research set out above, the word ‘example’ is a strong and rather inap-
propriate word to use in this context. In order to use it rightfully the basic standards of 
data protection applicable in the EU should have been complied with in the coopera-
tion with the US on data protection. Earlier research has proven that this is not entirely 
the case (De Busser, 2009a, p. 175-191). The essential element of the (application of 
the) adequacy requirement has also been examined in the transatlantic relations in 
criminal matters and resulted in a similar negative answer. The adequacy requirement 
is not consistently applied in the EU’s law enforcement and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters with third states.
According to the Stockholm Programme the ‘Union must be a driving force behind 
the development and promotion of international standards for personal data protection and 
in the conclusion of appropriate bilateral or multilateral instruments. The work on data pro-
tection conducted with the United States could serve as a basis for future Agreements.’ The 
question whether the EU – US cooperation in criminal matters should serve as a role 
model for data protection, should be answered in a negative manner. Without a solid 
check of possible inconsistencies between the EU level of data protection and the level 
of data protection of the US, personal data can now be transferred with American law 
enforcement and judicial authorities and be fairly effortlessly shared with other agen-
cies in the US. If this picture would function as an example for future bilateral and 
multilateral Agreements with other states, the data protection standards laid down by 
the widely ratified data protection Convention will be breached by a number of states. 
If this cooperation implying the elimination of the adequacy requirement would func-
tion as an example for future bilateral and multilateral Agreements, the additional 
protocol to the data protection Convention loses its meaning.
Obviously not every third state will apply specific rather than general rules on data 
protection and not every third state has a tradition of data sharing, encouraging the 
creation of Agreements based on the example of the Europol – US Agreement, the 
Eurojust – US Agreement and the EU – US Agreement, is not consistent with the idea 
of a stronger framework of data protection.
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6 Conclusion: coherency with a twist
The adequacy requirement is not a general condition for data transmission, which 
is an out of the ordinary way of working in criminal matters. Coherency is tradition-
ally the key word in the third pillar due to the risk of forum shopping. In the case of 
personal data exchange, an incoherent data protection policy would potentially result 
in data shopping. Furthermore, it could result in cross-pillar data shopping when the 
adequacy requirement is not uniformly applied in the first and third pillar. The reality 
of purpose deviation in the EU’s legal instruments intensifies this concern.
Due to the sensitivity of judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters, espe-
cially in cooperation with third states or institutions, it is at all times advisable to allow 
for a common attitude towards sending personal data with a view to inserting them 
in a criminal procedure. More specifically, a common attitude in protecting the use 
of the personal data after they have been transmitted – the adequacy requirement – is 
necessary in order to effectively protect our own EU standards. Independent from the 
question whether the EU lives up to its own standards, the data protection rules the 
EU lays down are thus not satisfactorily safeguarded in the cooperation with third 
states or institutions.
Furthermore, the differences between the assessment involved in fulfilling the 
adequacy requirement as implemented by Eurojust and Europol, add to the diversity 
of a safeguard that should protect all personal data originating from the EU.
With Eurojust, Europol and the national data protection regulations being excluded 
from the scope of the new framework decision on data protection in criminal mat-
ters, this instrument has only added to the lack of coherency in this field. The same 
instrument has provided in the adequacy requirement but failed to make this a strong 
prerequisite in the relations with third states or institutions by including derogations 
that can be fairly effortlessly used to circumvent the assessment of an adequate level 
of data protection.
Nevertheless, even when an adequate level of data protection is laid down as a 
conditio sine qua non, it is not always applied. The agreements the US concluded with 
Europol and Eurojust are good examples. In particular because this requirement was 
complied with in the relations with other third states, increases incoherency. Both 
Europol and Eurojust support more lenient standards in their cooperation with the 
US than in their cooperation with other third states. The US was in fact labeled as 
supporting an adequate level of data protection, where the necessary confirmation for 
this label was not provided and cannot be provided.
Data protection provisions in future agreements with other third states could 
potentially suffer when the new partners in the negotiation demand the same lenient 
rules from Europol or Eurojust in order to obtain an easier exchange of data.
The EU has not developed cooperation agreements of the same type with any other 
third states, but was equally accommodating to the US in pushing aside the adequacy 
requirement. This equally weakens the position of the EU to demand compliance with 
its data protection standards in future agreements of this type. The risk of negotiating 
basic data protection rules in the cooperation with third states and institutions thus 
increases when no coherent policy is developed on the protection of the EU’s data 
protection standards in outgoing data exchange.
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In the future plans for developing further cooperation with third states, the trend 
continues. Especially with regard to the transatlantic cooperation, the label of an 
adequate partner for cooperation in criminal matters is strong. So strong that plans 
for a Euro-Atlantic zone of cooperation have surfaced in which the cooperation with 
the US would run along the same lines as the cooperation between the EU member 
states. Disregarding the basic principles required for this type of cooperation and the 
fact that their fulfilment is equally within the EU incomplete, does not bode well for 
the coherency of future policy plans for judicial and law enforcement cooperation in 
criminal matters.
There is thus a significant need for a common attitude on the requirement of an 
adequate level of data protection within the EU as well as in the EU’s relations with 
third states and institutions.
Regardless of the EU pillar that encompasses the specific exchange of personal 
data, the adequacy requirement should be applied by all member states and by the 
EU institutions and the EU itself in their relations with third states, including the US. 
Ensuring coherency means a genuine assessment of the adequacy of the third state’s 
data protection level rather than rubber stamping a state as being adequate without 
thorough evaluation. Ensuring coherency also means developing a common assess-
ment method, equally in a cross-pillar fashion. This common attitude should equally 
be sustained regardless of the fact whether the exchange of personal data encom-
passes the exchange of domestically gathered data or data received or made available 
by another member state. However, it is clear that the more recent legal instruments 
covering judicial and law enforcement data exchange between the EU member states 
and in the transatlantic cooperation in criminal matters as well as the most recent 
framework decision on data protection in criminal matters, do not answer to this need 
for coherency.
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